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Is Prospero Just? Platonic Virtue in 
William Shakespeare’s The Tempest 
ANTHONY JANNOTTA
The Tempest is often regarded, and rightly so, as Shakespeare’s last great play.  Many scholars argue that Prospero is an analogue for Shakespeare himself, noting the similarities between Prospero’s illusory magic and Shakespeare’s poetic genius.  The themes of imagination, 
illusion, and, indeed, theatre itself play an integral role.  The line that is perhaps 
most often cited as evidence for this argument is Prospero’s speech directly after he 
breaks up the wedding masque in which he refers to “the great globe itself ” (IV.
i.153).1  There is a danger, however, in appealing to the author’s biography or 
treating the biography as paramount, namely that the art work loses its autonomy. 
Barbara Tovey, while not adopting this interpretation per se, posits a species of this 
argument.  She reads The Tempest as Shakespeare’s direct response to, and defense 
of, Plato’s conception of imitative poetry found in The Republic.  Biographical 
criticism, however valuable it may be, will not be our main concern; rather, we 
will shift the focus from Shakespeare’s biography to the text of The Republic.
Tovey’s essay, “Shakespeare’s Apology for Imitative Poetry: The Tempest and 
The Republic,” is an exercise in both historical and political criticism that takes 
into account the ideal city of which Socrates speaks in The Republic.2  A more 
psychological approach using Plato’s Republic, however, can yield an equally 
valuable discussion.  If we remind ourselves that the main concern of The 
Republic is not to provide a blueprint of the perfect city but rather to provide 
an account of the nature of justice, we can easily see that the tripartite ideal 
city is a metaphor or analogy for the human psyche.  There are many parallels 
between The Republic and The Tempest and, indeed, Platonic philosophy 
in general.  G. Wilson Knight, for example, in his essay “Prospero’s Lonely 
Magic,” mentions “Plato’s two steeds of the soul” (Knight 137).  This is, of 
course, a reference to The Phaedrus, another Platonic dialogue.  Knight does 
not develop the idea fully, but if he had, it isn’t obvious where that line of 
inquiry would have taken us.  Knight makes an interesting observation, but 
a more profitable means of inquiry is to be found in The Republic. In order 
to accomplish this we need to take a look at what Plato considered virtues, 
which, if properly cultivated, help bring about justice.  The Platonic idea of 
justice and virtue as a lens through which to examine Prospero reveals to us 
a better understanding of the development of his character throughout the 
course of the play.  We should though offer a brief explication of Platonic 
justice before addressing The Tempest.
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The Republic is concerned with the nature of justice in the 
individual, how Plato arrives at this point, though, is through 
a lengthy discussion of justice in the ideal city.  Socrates states, 
“let’s first find out what sort of thing justice is in a city and 
afterwards look for it in the individual, observing the ways in 
which the smaller is similar to the larger” (369).3 This is not 
to say that The Republic doesn’t contain any political insight; 
surely it does.  Books VIII and IX deal with the way in which 
the various kinds of governments become increasingly less just 
i.e. the timocracy becoming the oligarchy and so forth.  Again, 
Plato uses the constitutions of these various governments to talk 
about the similar process that occurs in the human psyche.
Plato’s conception of the ideal city is tripartite; there is a ruling 
class (guardians), a solider class (auxiliaries), and a working 
class (craftsman).  Likewise, the human psyche has three parts: 
the rational, the spirited, and the appetitive.  The city and 
the psyche are analogous in that each section of the city has 
a particular function similar to the corresponding section of 
the psyche: the guardians, auxiliaries, and workers correspond 
to the rational, spirited, and appetitive, respectively. We will 
return to this shortly. After laying out the class structure of the 
city, Socrates’ interlocutors urge him to continue his discussion 
of justice.  Socrates remarks that “[he thinks the] city, if indeed 
it has been correctly founded, is completely good” (427e).  He 
goes on to say that if the city is completely good then it will be 
“wise, courageous, moderate, and just” (427e).  Socrates and 
company begin to examine the city with the hope of discovering 
justice through a process of elimination; finding the other 
virtues first will ensure that whatever is left over will be justice. 
Let’s consider the city and the psyche simultaneously.
Socrates and his interlocutors discover wisdom first.  Only 
the guardians possess wisdom which is defined as both good 
judgment and a special knowledge of ruling; knowing what 
is best for each part of the city.  Guardians are also necessarily 
wiser than the members of the other classes because they are 
philosophers.  Wisdom in the human psyche is located in “that 
small part of himself that rules in him and makes … declarations 
and has within it the knowledge of what is advantageous for 
each part and for the whole soul” (442c).  The rational is most 
suited to ruling the psyche because it is the seat of wisdom, 
calculation, and learning.  
The city is considered courageous “because of a part of itself 
[auxiliaries] that has the power to preserve through everything 
its belief about what things are to be feared” (429c).  The 
upbringing of the soldiers allows them to unwaveringly 
internalize the laws of the city like well prepared wool that 
once dyed holds its color (429e).  Likewise, courage is located 
in the spirited portion (the same portion that wills, desires, 
and emotes) of the psyche and we say one is courageous “when 
[the spirited part] preserves through pains and pleasures the 
declarations of reason about what is to be feared and what isn’t” 
(442c).  Courage is a kind of steadfastness or resoluteness which 
the spirited part exhibits when it obeys the rational part.
Moderation isn’t localized in one class but rather it is shared 
among them.  The city contains a diversity of natures: the 
guardians are, of course, the best natured while the majority of 
the remaining citizens have a poorer nature (431c).  Nevertheless 
the “unanimity” or “agreement between the naturally worse 
and naturally better as to which of the two is to rule both in 
the city and in each one, is rightly called moderation” (432a-b). 
Moderation is akin to self-control. One may have self-control 
when the “naturally better part is in control of the worse” 
(431b).  Likewise, when the larger worse part overpowers the 
smaller better part (of a person or city) “this is called being self-
defeated or licentious” (431b).  In the psyche, each part agrees 
that reason and the rational part should rule and do not seek to 
“engage in civil war against it” (442d).  
The last remaining virtue is justice, what is “left over” in 
Socrates’ discussion of the city’s virtues.  Socrates states that 
“justice is doing one’s own work and not meddling with what 
isn’t one’s own” (443b).  A more psychic description of the just 
person is one who does “not allow any part of himself to do the 
work of another part or allow the various classes within him 
to meddle with each other” (443d).  When reason is allowed 
to rule and the appetites and emotions are not trying to rule 
in its stead, only then can a person’s actions be said to be just. 
The preservation of this “inner harmony” is justice and those 
actions that disrupt the inner harmony are unjust (443e).  The 
Tempest offers us a vivid representation of many of Plato’s 
remarks concerning the psyche and virtue. 
We can point out the similarities and parallels between The 
Tempest and The Republic without making claims regarding 
Shakespeare’s intentions.  The Tempest, nevertheless, embodies 
or concretizes the parts of the Platonic psyche in its characters. 
Prospero, Ariel, and Caliban all exhibit more of one particular 
psychic portion: Prospero represents the rational, Ariel the 
spirited, and Caliban the appetitive.  Tovey rightly observes 
that “Caliban is a creature of bodily appetites and impulses” 
and, indeed, “much of his talk throughout the play turns 
on food” (291).  Each of these characters, though, is not a 
manifestation of just any spirited or appetitive psyche ,but 
rather, each character is a manifestation of Prospero’s psyche; 
as Knight puts it, Ariel and Caliban “are yoked in the employ 
of Prospero” (137).  While there is a definite master-slave 
relationship between Prospero and the other characters there is 
a great deal of Prospero’s language that is dedicated to ownership 
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or possessiveness that suggests inclusion.  It is not just any Ariel, 
it is “my Ariel” (I.ii.188) or “my delicate Ariel” (IV.i.49) or “my 
spirit” (V.i.6).  Prospero speaks of Caliban, too, in the possessive 
but in a much more disparaging tone: “Caliban, my slave, who 
never / yields us kind answer” (I.ii.308-9).  Let’s examine these 
characters but with Prospero and the Platonic virtues in mind. 
We shall find that Prospero cannot be virtuous in the Platonic 
sense until the play’s last act.
Prospero embodies the rational part of the Platonic psyche.  We 
can see his inclination toward wisdom and knowledge in his 
recounting to Miranda of how it is that they came to the island. 
Prospero, “being transported / And rapt in secret studies” 
(I.ii.76-77), casts “the government … upon [his] brother” 
Antonio (I.ii.75).  This in turn “[awakes] an evil nature” in his 
brother that ultimately leads him to usurp Prospero’s dukedom, 
although Prospero is rightfully and technically still duke of 
Milan.  His enthusiasm for the “liberal arts” (I.ii.73) leads him 
to “[neglect] worldly ends” (I.ii.89) and seek privacy for “the 
bettering of [his] mind” (I.ii.90).  Even the dim-witted Caliban 
knows that if one wants to overthrow Prospero one can “brain 
him” (III.ii.88) but only after “having first seized his books” 
(III.ii.89).  Clearly, if there is any character that embodies the 
rational portion of the psyche, it is Prospero.  
Ariel represents the spirited portion of Prospero’s psyche. 
Ariel’s function on the island, at least to Prospero, is one of 
subservience.  Plato also has this same role in mind when he 
writes about the spirited portion’s function.  Socrates asks 
Glaucon: “isn’t it appropriate for the rational part to rule, since 
it is really wise and exercises foresight on behalf of the whole 
soul, and for the spirited part to obey it and be its ally?” (441e). 
The answer, of course, is yes.  And indeed Ariel fulfills a similar 
function for Prospero.  After all it is Ariel who “[performs] 
to point the tempest that [Prospero] bade [him]” (I.ii.194), 
divides the shipwrecked passengers “in troops … ‘bout the 
isle” (I.ii.220), and stores the King’s ship “safely in harbor” 
(I.ii.226).  Ariel’s service to Prospero continues into the 
play’s last act. Prospero, when he demands Ariel’s continued 
subservience in Act I, scene ii, even assigns Ariel the pejorative 
“moody;” here it means stubbornness but it can also connote 
emotionality, something for which the spirited portion of the 
psyche is responsible (I.ii.244).  The other things that fall under 
Ariel’s domain are things normally associated with the spirited 
portion: the songs he sings, the dancing spirits he summons, 
and the banquet he materializes and promptly vanishes for 
Antonio and company.  
If we look at Ariel and Prospero in terms of Platonic virtue, thus 
far we see that Prospero, the rational, is in control of Ariel, the 
spirited, precisely as Plato suggests.  It is a forced subservience 
but the “correct” arrangement; Ariel “obeys” and is a kind of 
“ally” to Prospero.  Prospero, by definition, is not moderate 
since the arrangement is forced and not completely unanimous 
and therefore cannot be just.  Both Ariel and Caliban protest 
Prospero’s rule on the island and until all three characters can 
reach an agreement Prospero cannot be virtuous. 
Caliban represents the appetitive portion and, like Ariel, 
dislikes his position in the hierarchy of the island.  Plato 
conceives of the appetitive portion as the larger and baser 
portion that includes things like food, drink, and sex.  One 
of the first things we learn of Caliban is his attempted rape of 
Miranda; Prospero used to allow him to stay in his “cell till [he] 
… [sought] to violate / The honor of [his] child” (I.ii.347-8). 
Plato also urged for a finer control over the appetites and we 
see Prospero continuously threatening Caliban with “cramps” 
and “pinches” at various points throughout the play.  Ariel 
is quicker to obey than is Caliban.  Prospero and Miranda 
“cannot miss him”, though, because he does perform for them 
certain chores (I.ii.311).  Despite our baser needs we cannot 
escape from them.  
We have established Ariel’s unruliness, but Caliban’s is of a 
higher magnitude.  Caliban’s run in with Stephano and Trinculo 
reveals to us just how much Caliban resents Prospero.  Caliban 
sees Prospero as “a tyrant, / A sorcerer, that by his cunning hath 
/ Cheated [him] of the island” (III.ii.41-4).   He proceeds to 
urge Stephano to “revenge it on him” (III.ii.54).  If we recall 
that moderation involves each part of the psyche agreeing that 
the smaller portion, the rational, should rule over the bigger 
portions, the appetitive and the spirited, and that “they should 
not engage in civil war against it” (442d), we see that, still, at 
this point in the play, by definition, Prospero isn’t moderate, 
not with his appetitive portion plotting to kill him.
Prospero’s desire for vengeance, to repay his usurping brother, 
drives much of The Tempest’s action.  His treatment of Antonio 
and company via Ariel throughout the play’s middle acts 
serves as a kind of vengeance so that by the time we reach 
Act V Prospero’s character is transformed.  Ariel remarks how 
Prospero’s “charm so strongly works ‘em / That if [he] now 
beheld them, [his] affections / would become tender” (V.i.17-
9).  Despite Prospero’s indignation, he realizes that he should 
favor his “nobler reason ‘gainst [his] fury” (V.i.26) and that 
“The rarer action is / In virtue than in vengeance” (V.i.27-8). 
Shortly after Prospero explicitly states he will choose virtue 
over vengeance, Caliban realizes that he mistakenly assumed 
Stephano “for a god” (V.i.297) and he remarks on “how fine 
[his] master is” (V.i.262).  Prospero, in turn, says of Caliban, 
“this thing of darkness I / Acknowledge mine” (V.i.275-6). 
A few lines later, Caliban, after Prospero instructs him to 
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prepare his cell, assures Prospero that “[he’ll] be wise hereafter” 
(V.i.295).  The appetitive and the rational both agree that the 
better part should rule.  Prospero is finally moderate, but is he 
just? 
All the parts of the psyche must be in harmony for one to 
be considered just.  But in the final act of the play, Ariel is 
released from service and is no longer there to “obey” and be 
Prospero’s “ally.”  While it seems impossible to divorce oneself 
from any portion of one’s psyche, we can nevertheless regard 
Prospero’s choice to let Ariel go as a just act.  An action is just 
if it preserves the harmony among the portions of the psyche: 
letting Ariel go is just insofar as the action eliminates the strife 
we observed earlier in the play.  There is agreement among 
both the spirited and the appetitive that the rational should 
rule and none is trying to do the job or perform the function 
of the other.  At the close of Act V, we can regard Prospero as 
virtuous and just.
There is no doubt that Prospero undergoes a transformation; 
he can be regarded as vengeful up until the latter acts of the 
play.  There are, of course, many ways to understand his 
transformation but the play seems to provide us with characters 
that fit neatly with Plato’s conception of the human psyche 
found in The Republic.  Prospero, Ariel, and Caliban can be 
understood as the concretized elements of Prospero’s psyche. 
Prospero’s transformation, then, is found in his movement 
towards Platonic virtue throughout the play.  The tempest 
within Prospero quiets as the observable elements of his psyche, 
Ariel and Caliban, settle into harmony, each performing his 
own function and not interfering with the other.
To claim that Shakespeare had Plato’s work in mind when he 
composed The Tempest, the position of Tovey and others, is 
to argue for a claim that, most likely, will go unsubstantiated. 
Arguments like these rely heavily, because they must, on primary 
texts and their intertextuality.  But the next step, claiming that 
the author consciously incorporated elements of another text, 
especially when both authors have been dead for centuries, does 
little to bolster one’s argument.  There is no doubt, however, 
that Ancient Greek philosophy, especially Plato, has shaped 
the western consciousness.  It is entirely possible—indeed 
likely—that Shakespeare was aware, if only through second 
hand sources, of basic Platonic notions.  Platonic thought, 
specifically The Republic, is one of many underpinnings for 
The Tempest.  Shakespeare’s last great play moves us by virtue 
of its literary achievement while, at the same time, it resonates 
deeply with a broader tradition in thought and culture.  
Notes
William Shakespeare, The Tempest. Ed. G. Blakemore Evans. The 
Riverside Shakespeare 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1997).  All references are to Act, scene, line divisions in this edition.
2 Socrates is often regarded as a conduit for Plato.  But to regard the 
character Socrates as such is potentially to undermine the dialectical 
nature of all of Plato’s writings.  For the purposes of this paper, 
however, “Plato” and “Socrates” will be used interchangeably.
3 Plato, The Republic. Trans. G.M.A. Grube, rev. C.D.C. Reeve. Plato 
Complete Works. Ed. John M. Cooper. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997). 
All references are to Stephanus numbers in this translation.  
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